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Abstract
Understanding the dynamic processes of a real game system requires an ap-
propriate dynamics model, and rigorously testing a dynamics model is non-
trivial. In our methodological research, we develop an approach to testing
the validity of game dynamics models that considers the dynamic patterns of
angular momentum and speed as measurement variables. Using Rock-Paper-
Scissors (RPS) games as an example, we illustrate the geometric patterns in
the experiment data. We then derive the related theoretical patterns from
a series of typical dynamics models. By testing the goodness-of-fit between
the experimental and theoretical patterns, we show that the validity of these
models can be evaluated quantitatively. Our approach establishes a link be-
tween dynamics models and experimental systems, which is, to the best of
our knowledge, the most effective and rigorous strategy for ascertaining the
testability of evolutionary game dynamics models.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, experimental economics, dynamic
pattern, angular momentum, speed;
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1. Introduction
1.1. Research question
Evolutionary game theory, rooted in classical game theory [1, 2] and evo-
lutionary theory [3], has been widely used to study the dynamical behaviors
of game systems [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. Since the Replicator
dynamics model was first proposed [15], a substantial number of evolution-
ary game dynamics models have been developed (e.g., [13]). These dynamics
models can be classified by their update protocols [13] or geometric proper-
ties [16], and can thus produce rich theoretical evolutionary dynamics. Each
model has its own quantitative predictions. For example, as shown in Fig.
1, two Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) games with identical rest points (or Nash
equilibria, in classical game theory) have different trajectories induced by
the same model. However, for the same RPS game, the trajectories induced
by different models are obviously different. These findings have now become
standard textbook content on evolutionary dynamics [4, 6, 7, 12, 13].
Naturally, the reality of evolutionary dynamics models have been widely
considered [27, 28, 29, 30]. In recent decades, social scientists have con-
tinued to investigate and improve upon the commonalities between models
and experiments [18, 19, 11, 20, 21, 22, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26]. However, there
is still a significant gap between evolutionary outcomes from models and
empirical results. Without loss of generality, the gap can be seen in rep-
resentative RPS game experiments [23, 26, 17, 24, 31, 32]. Scientists have
clearly illustrated how to distinguish various games with models in experi-
ments [31, 23, 26, 17, 24]; however, distinguishing various models associated
with games in experiments has only rarely been achieved. For a given game
experiment, it seems that the dynamics model could be arbitrarily chosen
because various models have similar expectations regarding existing obser-
vations, which is unsatisfying. Hence, rigorous testing of game dynamics
models has been an open question.
1.2. Logic of our approach
In this methodological study, we aim to answer this question through a
novel approach inspired by two recent advances in game experiments. The
first concerns measurements. In game experiments, by considering the time
reversal symmetry in high stochastic trajectories of social state motions, the
observations of deterministic motions (e.g., cycle frequency [33, 34, 32], cyclic
3
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Figure 1: Evolutionary trajectories of the two RPS games derived from two
models. (a) and (b) depict the payoff matrices for the RPS games used as examples in
Ref. [17] and this study, and are unstable (denoted by Gu) and stable (denoted by Gs)
RPS games, respectively. Theoretically, the rest points of Gu and Gs are identical in (1/4,
1/4, 1/2) in the state space (also called the simplex). In (c-f), the black lines and arrows
indicate evolutionary trajectories. In (c) and (d), the evolutionary trajectories are derived
from the Replicator dynamics model using Gu and Gs, respectively. Similarly, in (e) and
(f), the results come from the Projection dynamics model.
motion vector field [35, 36, 37], and cycle counting index [17]) have been quan-
tified, which led us to explore new measurements of dynamic patterns. The
second development is in the domain of experimental technology, which has
enabled the realization of continuous time experiments from which sufficiently
long trajectories can be harvested [38, 17]. The continuous-time, continuous-
strategy, and instantaneous treatment of the two RPS games shown in Fig.
1 [17] is an exemplar of such experiments. Without loss of generality, the
data from this experiment can be employed to demonstrate our approach.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two measure-
ments for dynamical observations: angular momentum L and speed S. In
Section 3, using RPS games experiments data[17], we demonstrate experi-
mental dynamical patterns. In Section 4, we derive the theoretical dynamical
patterns from a series of typical dynamics models specified by the RPS game
payoff matrix. We then, in Section 5, test the goodness-of-fit of the theoreti-
cal and experimental patterns. From this procedure, our proposed approach
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can distinguish which dynamics models should be considered as candidates
for describing the dynamical behaviors of a given experimental system. In
Section 7, the advantages of this approach, as well as related literature and
further research questions, are discussed.
2. Measurements for dynamical patterns
2.1. Time series, evolutionary trajectory, and velocity
Without loss of generality, in a real-time RPS game experiment system,
we can obtain a time series, as shown in Fig.2 (a), indicating strategy frac-
tions as a function of time. We can use a strategy vector given by [PR, PP , PS]
to represent the fractions of Rock, Paper, and Scissors, respectively, at each
time step. Correspondingly, the strategy vector at each time step can be
plotted as a state point in the simplex (state space), and the state points for
all strategy vector values form the evolutionary trajectory in experiments,
as shown in Fig. 2(b). Based on the evolutionary trajectory in the phase
space, we can introduce two measurements at state x, speed Sx and angular
momentum Lx, as follows.
2.2. Speed S at state x
We assume that the state of strategy vector x at time t is x(t), which is
written as [PR, PP , PS]. Accordingly, the states at t-1 and t+1 are x(t − 1)
and x(t + 1), respectively. We then define a jump-out transition for state
x(t) as x+ = x(t+ 1)− x(t). Similarly, a jump-in transition for state x(t) is
x− = x(t) − x(t− 1). Thus, an observation of instantaneous velocity vx at
state x(t) can be defined as [36]
vx =
x+ + x−
2∆t
=
x(t+ 1)− x(t− 1)
2∆t
, (1)
where ∆t is the time interval, which is set to one in the two RPS experiments.
In Figure 2 (b), two examples of instantaneous velocity are illustrated. The
corresponding average instantaneous velocity value observed at x is [36],
v¯x = [v¯R, v¯P , v¯S], where v¯R, v¯P , and v¯S are the average velocity compo-
nents at state x. This measurement of average velocity is of time-reversal
asymmetry and describes the deterministic motion observed [33, 36].
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Figure 2: Time series, evolutionary trajectory, and dynamical observation. (a) is a sample
time series of 60-second records from the RPS game experiments. (b) depicts the time
series (from the seconds 10–16 in (a)) in the phase space of the RPS game. The red
segments indicate the evolutionary trajectory and the blue arrow indicates instantaneous
velocity.
To clearly compare the speed values in various models and in experiments,
we further define the magnitude of average velocity v¯x at state x as
Sx = ||v¯x|| =
√
v¯2R + v¯
2
P + v¯
2
S. (2)
2.3. Angular momentum L at state x
Based on the definition of velocity, we further define angular momentum
Lx at state x as
Lx = (x−O)× v¯x, (3)
where × indicates the cross-product of the two vectors and O is the state
vector for the Nash equilibrium strategy in the state space. Correspond-
ingly, Lx = [LR, LP , LS], where LR, LP , and LS are the angular momentum
components at state x(t) in the state space (see Figure S2 in Supplementary
6
Information). We point out that per the definition of angular momentum,
all the angular momentum vectors in the state space should be parallel with
the vector [1, 1, 1], which means that the values of the three components are
identical. Thus, we can directly choose one component of the vector for com-
paring angular momentums. For simplicity, we choose LR, define L = LR,
and then compare the L values of angular momentums in various models
and experiments. Note that the L value for one angular momentum could be
negative or positive because the direction of vector Lx could be the opposite
or the same as that of vector [1, 1, 1]. Further, this measurement is also of
time reversal asymmetry and describes the deterministic motion observed
[33, 36].
3. Experimental dynamic patterns
3.1. Data
To illustrate the dynamical patterns in real systems, we use data from
RPS game experiments as an example. Eight human subjects participated
in the experiments, playing RPS against the other 7 subjects. The exper-
iments are of continuous-time and continuous-strategy instantaneous treat-
ments [17]. In the experiments, the strategies used were simply recorded each
second in real time; the strategies used by each subject were instantaneously
known to all 8 subjects. The payoff matrices are the game parameters con-
trolled by the experimenters, which are shown in Fig. 1 (a) and (b), and
respectively represent the unstable and stable RPS games. There are 6300-
(5400-)second records from the unstable (stable) RPS game experiments used
in our study (For more details, see Section S2.1 and Figure S1 in Supple-
mentary Information). We used these data to illustrate the experimental
dynamical patterns employed to test the dynamics models.
3.2. Method
By employing the measurement of Lx and Sx shown in Equation 2 and
Equation 3, respectively, and using the time series from the two RPS game
experiments, we can obtain the experimental dynamical patterns.
3.3. Results
Figures 3 (i–l) illustrate the experimental dynamic patterns of the angular
momentum L and speed S of the two RPS games. In these four figures, the
blue (red) color corresponds to the relative low (high) values of L or S. To
7
present these four figures, we have separated the state space into discrete
counterparts, herein called patches or cells, with resolution of 0.050 (denoted
by d, see Appendix A for its definition. The result of setting the resolution
to 0.025 and 0.100 are similar and are shown in Section S3 in Supplementary
Information). To our knowledge, in existing literature relating to real systems
in evolutionary game theory, such high-precision empirical dynamic patterns
have not yet been seen.
Corresponding to the four theoretical results mentioned above, we list four
experimental results in Fig. 3 and compare them with existing literature [17].
• First, in each simplex, the observed L and S at state points around the
rest point (1
4
, 1
4
, 1
2
) are minimal and are close to zero. These empirical
observations meet the predictions of the nonparametric models well;
none of the nonparametric models can be rejected (or excluded) by
this empirical result.
• Second, in all patches in the simplex, the observed L values are not
negative in the simplex globally. (In the high-resolution case, we have
observed negative values in some patches, though the number of patches
is very small and the negative values are very close 0, which can be
regarded as noise and ignored in this case study). Thus, with respect
to the rest point, the direction of the average motion of social state
rotation is counter-clockwise. These empirical observations also meet
the expectations of the nonparametric models.
• Third, in the experimental patterns, the numbers of white (blank)
patches in the unstable RPS game (Fig. 3 (i,j)) are significantly less
than those in the stable RPS game (Fig. 2 (k,l)). This means that the
stationary distribution (time average of the trajectory distribution) of
the unstable RPS game is closer to the simplex edge. This result agrees
with the theoretical expectation mentioned above, and with previous
results [24, 17].
• Fourth, for both RPS games, the values of the observed L and S are
larger in the patches closer to the edge than those closer to the rest
point. That is, the deterministic motions are faster in the social state
close to the simplex edge than those close to the rest point. This
result was previously unknown; moreover, such clear and high-precision
empirical patterns have not been seen [23, 26, 24, 17]. We use the
observed values in each patch to evaluate the theoretical models.
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The first three experimental results above correspond well to model pre-
dictions, but these results provide little help in distinguishing models. To
distinguish the models, our approach mainly depends on the fourth result.
4. Theoretical dynamic patterns
4.1. Theoretical Models
To test whether a dynamics model meets the experimental dynamical
patterns, we must deduce the related dynamical observations in the model.
In this study, we evaluate 15 typical evolutionary game dynamics models,
which have been clearly summarized and extensively explained in [13, 39]
and its software suite. The models, listed in Table 1, can be classified into
two classes: nonparametric and parametric (for which parameters are shown
in parentheses following the model name). Each of the 15 dynamics models
has its own mechanism (update rule), and can be explicitly presented as a set
of differential equations. For readers who are not familiar with evolutionary
game dynamics models, we use two of the 15 models as examples. One
example of a dynamics model is the Replicator dynamics model, which can
be presented as
x˙i = xi(Exi − E¯x), (4)
in which xi is the density of i-strategy, Exi is the payoff of the i-strategists at
state x, and E¯ is the weighted average of the payoff of the population. That
is, the density growth rate (update rule) is based on the payoff difference.
Another model is the Projection dynamics model (see p. 199 in [13]), in
which the growth rate (velocity) of i-strategy can be presented as
x˙i = Exi − E˜x, (5)
in which Exi is the payoff of the i-strategy population at state x and E˜x the
unweighted average of the payoff of the population. Importantly, at state x
in the state space, the theoretical velocity value is depicted by the differential
equations.
4.2. Method
With the theoretical velocity at state x, referring to Equation (2), the
theoretical pattern of speed Sx can be obtained; at the same time, by refer-
ring to Equation (3), the theoretical pattern of angular momentum Lx can
be obtained. Thus, for each of the 15 models, we can obtain the theoretical
patterns of Sx and Lx.
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4.3. Results
Figures 2 (a–h) illustrate the theoretical dynamic patterns of the an-
gular momentum L and speed S for the stable and unstable RPS games,
as derived from the Replicator and Projection dynamics models. For more
theoretical patterns for the models, see Section S4 in Supplementary Infor-
mation. Among the patterns of the 15 models, four items characterizing the
theoretical results, which correspond to the experimental patterns, are listed
as follows:
• First, the angular momentum L and speed S are minimal and close
to zero for the state surrounding the rest point (1
4
, 1
4
, 1
2
). This result
is widespread among the nonparametric models, which is meaningful
because if this result significantly deviates from the experimental result,
all nonparametric models must be rejected and cannot be valid for the
given experiments.
• Second, the expected values of angular momentum L are not negative
in the full simplex. Therefore, there should exist counter-clockwise
cycles with respect to the rest point in the simplex.
• Third, in all the dynamics models tested in this study, for the unstable
RPS game, the evolutionary trajectories have outward spirals and close
in on the simplex edge. In contrast, for the stable RPS game, the
evolutionary trajectories have inward spirals and are closing in on the
rest point.
• Fourth, more importantly, the differences between the dynamic pat-
terns derived from different dynamics models are obvious. These dif-
ferences imply that not every model can be valid for a given experimen-
tal system, because the experimental result is unique; only a model in
which the pattern matches the experimental pattern well can be valid
for the given experiment.
We can see that, referring to the first three items, the models usually
have the same results. Hence, we cannot use the first three items results to
distinguish models.
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5. Model Evaluation
5.1. Method
Quantitatively, we use two coefficients (Pearson correlation coefficient ρ
and coefficient of determination R2) to evaluate the validity of a model by
comparing the experimental and theoretical dynamical patterns. For a given
observation, ideally, ρ and R2 should be 1 (the maximum). The larger the
value of ρ, the more appropriate the model. Alternatively, if ρ and R2 are
close to 0 or are negative, the model is not appropriate for the experimental
system. (For details, see Appendix B.)
To illustrate the logic of our approach to evaluating models, we first pro-
vide a simple example. Figure 3 demonstrates how to obtain coefficients
ρ and R2 and how to compare the performance of two models. Figure 4
(c) illustrates the ρ and R2 of observations S and L, which are obtained
from Fig. 3 (a) and (b) for the Replicator and Projection dynamics mod-
els, respectively. As illustrated in Fig. 4 (c), with larger ρ and R2 values,
the Projection dynamics model is more valid and performs better than the
Replicator dynamics model.
5.2. Results
For each of the 15 models, the goodness-of-fit (ρ and R2) of the model
and experiments are summarized in Table 1. Here, we show that the validity
of a model can be quantified.
With Table 1, model comparisons can be realized. Table 2 reports the
statistical results of pairwise comparison of the 15 models. (For details of the
statistical methods used in these comparisons, see Appendix B.) In each cell
in Table 2, the statistic index +1 (−1) indicates that the model in that row
performs significantly better (worse) than that in the column (p < 0.05, see
Section S6.3.2 in Supplementary Information for p-values), while the statistic
index 0 indicates similar performance (p > 0.05). Then, for each model, we
can obtain its score by adding the statistic indices as shown in the last column
in Table 2.
5.2.1. Explanation of Results
Table 2 can be explained with examples. An example result is that,
among the 6 nonparametric models, the Replicator, BR, and MSReplicator
dynamics models performed the worst, indicating that these models are not
fit for interpreting the experimental system, whereas the Projection dynamics
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model performs the best. Another example result is that, among the Logit
dynamics models tested in this study, the model with parameter 10 performs
the best. These examples indicate that the validity of dynamics models can
be evaluated and compared quantitatively.
5.2.2. Robustness of Results
The results shown in Table 2 are robust to various statistical methods
(e.g., Student’s t-test) and changing resolutions or cut-off counts (see Sec-
tion S6 in Supplementary Information for more details). The main results
in Table 2 remain unchanged if we choose only one of the two RPS game
experiments, instead of using both. This means that (1) the validity of a
model is independent of the game details. Such a result is common in the
interplay between experiments and models in classical game theory [40, 41].
(2) Our approach seems efficient in evaluating the validity of various models
with one game experiment.
Table 1: Goodness-of-fit of the theoretical and experimental patterns†
ρ R2
Unstable RPS Stable RPS Unstable RPS Stable RPS
Dynamics Model Name L S L S L S L S
Replicator 0.393 0.336 0.560 0.479 0.020 0.004 0.086 −0.011
BR 0.844 0.441 0.730 0.483 0.657 −0.184 0.251 −2.306
MSReplicator 0.371 0.315 0.599 0.541 −0.005 −0.011 0.151 0.079
BNN 0.826 0.853 0.900 0.830 0.679 0.713 0.809 0.688
ILogit(0.1) 0.829 0.441 0.726 0.482 0.637 −0.121 0.229 −1.817
SampleBR(2) 0.910 0.695 0.820 0.777 0.825 0.464 0.634 0.452
Smith 0.736 0.651 0.860 0.848 0.479 0.379 0.694 0.692
Logit(0.001) 0.844 0.441 0.730 0.483 0.657 −0.184 0.251 −2.306
Logit(0.01) 0.844 0.441 0.730 0.483 0.657 −0.184 0.251 −2.306
Logit(0.1) 0.844 0.440 0.730 0.483 0.657 −0.184 0.251 −2.306
Logit(1) 0.854 0.512 0.732 0.526 0.676 −0.072 0.256 −2.030
Logit(10) 0.880 0.853 0.841 0.764 0.759 0.720 0.648 0.348
Logit(100) 0.681 0.727 0.453 0.563 0.417 0.492 0.201 −0.056
Logit(1000) 0.350 0.710 0.153 0.490 0.063 0.459 0.005 −0.201
Projection 0.915 0.859 0.876 0.802 0.837 0.736 0.723 0.557
†The meaning of the models and their parameters refers to the textbook and its software suite [13, 39].
6. Discussion
Summary —— This work makes two contributions to evolutionary
game dynamics. First, by introducing two natural metrics, we illustrate
12
Figure 3: Experimental and theoretical patterns for L and S of the two RPS
games. (a–d) and (e–h) depict the theoretical patterns derived from the Replicator and
Projection dynamics models, respectively. (i–l) depict the experimental patterns, which
are obtained for the resolution d = 0.050. Dark blue corresponds to the lowest value (0, in
this case study). For each subfigure, the brightest red indicates the relative highest value
of that subfigure. The white patches indicate that no observation was obtained in those
patches in the experiments because the evolutionary trajectories could have never visited
these patches.
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Figure 4: An example comparison of two models. The theoretical and experimental
observations of the same patches in the simplex of the unstable RPS game (resolution
d = 0.100). (a) shows the results of L, in which the red circles (blue crosses) depict
the experimental versus the theoretical values obtained from the Replicator (Projection)
dynamics model. (b) shows the results of S. (c) compares the ρ and R2 values of the
scatting.
two new geometric patterns, angular momentum and speed (see Fig. 3). To
the best of our knowledge, such high-precision empirical dynamic patterns
have not been made available in the literature relating to real systems on
evolutionary game theory. Second, based on these geometric patterns, we
have illustrated an approach to testing which dynamics models might be
more suited to a given game experimental system (see Tables 1 and 2). In
previous works (e.g.,[23, 26, 17, 24, 31]), it had seemed that the dynamics
model could be arbitrarily chosen because the models could not be clearly
distinguished by experimental observations. Here, we show that the dynam-
ics model cannot be arbitrarily chosen for a given game experimental system
because some typical models are demonstrably unsuitable. Of course, using
our approach, we can also determine which models are appropriate for a given
experimental scenario. Thus, this approach can establish a link between dy-
namics models and experimental systems, which is, we would argue, by far
the most effective and rigorous strategy for the testability of evolutionary
game dynamics models.
On comparisons with existing literature —— Researchers have
clearly shown how to distinguish various games in experiments with models[23,
26, 17, 24, 31], but have not successfully shown how to distinguish various
models with games experiments. There are probably two reasons for this.
First, the measurements to test the existence of cyclic [33, 17, 26], or spi-
ral characteristics for stable (or unstable) games [17, 24], or the direction
14
Table 2: Comparisons between dynamics models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) Score
(1) Replicator −5
(2) BR 0 −6
(3) MSReplicator 0 0 −5
(4) BNN 1 1 1 11
(5) ILogit(0.1) 0 0 0 −1 −6
(6) SampleBR(2) 1 1 1 −1 1 8
(7) Smith 1 1 1 0 1 0 9
(8) Logit(0.001) 0 0 0 −1 0 −1 −1 −6
(9) Logit(0.01) 0 0 0 −1 0 −1 −1 0 −6
(10) Logit(0.1) 0 0 0 −1 0 −1 −1 0 0 −6
(11) Logit(1) 0 1 0 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 0
(12) Logit(10) 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 9
(13) Logit(100) 0 0 0 −1 0 −1 −1 0 0 0 0 −1 −4
(14) Logit(1000) 0 0 0 −1 0 −1 −1 0 0 0 0 −1 −1 −6
(15) Projection 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13
of cycling [17], are intended to test the common characteristics of dynamics
models, which naturally tends to ignore the differences between the mod-
els. These measurements are therefore not appropriate for capturing the
difference between evolutionary dynamics models, although these measure-
ments clearly reveal that dynamics models significantly outperform the Nash
equilibrium concept of classical game theory [33, 23, 26, 17, 24]. Second,
obtaining a deterministic observation from highly stochastic data requires a
long time series [23, 33]. When the time series harvested is short, the ob-
served dynamic patterns would be too obscure to reveal distinctions between
models [17, 25, 21, 42, 43, 44, 22, 45]. Our measurements, on the other hand,
provide sufficient samples from the patches in the geometric patterns (shown
in Fig. 3(i–l)), and our approach can evaluate models quantitatively and
rigorously (shown in Tables 1 and 2).
On further research —— Although our approach can improve the
rigor of merging theory and data, the following questions remain. First, in
this study we estimate models with simple linear regression. We note that
the theoretical and experimental values do not match exactly. Indeed, this
relates to the open question in evolutionary game theory of methods of nor-
malizing the payoff matrix [42, 33, 46, 25] or time steps [17, 25]. Although
we simply used the values in the payoff matrix as utility to specify a model
for the game’s theoretical patterns, by following existing game literature
[21, 42, 33, 23, 26, 17, 24], we see that it is definitely important to further
study normalization [25]. Second, in this study, we introduced two observa-
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tions, L and S, though there may be others that can also distinguish the dif-
ferences among models. For future study, it would be meaningful to consider
and include more observations for testing dynamics models (e.g., the distri-
bution in state space [33, 17, 24]), because geometric patterns can provide
richer testable samples. Third, we have not compared the empirical patterns
(e.g., Fig. 2(i,j) versus Fig. 2(k,l)) for capturing the difference in dynamic
behaviors between the stable and unstable systems. This comparison could
be a new approach to understanding human social dynamic behaviors, which
has been widely studied for decades [46, 17, 24, 23]. Fourth, as macroscopic
social dynamics behaviors (called social learning [47]) are rooted in the micro-
scope learning models of games [48], which relate to algorithm game theory
and artificial intelligence, our approach can be applied to these fields. There
are other dynamics models involving microscopic update rules (e.g., Moran
processes [13] and pairwise imitation [7]) in addition to the 15 models tested
here. Evaluating these models with dynamical observations, like L and S
introduced in this paper, could be further tasks. Fifth, in this study, we have
considered only the deterministic motion of time reversal asymmetry. The
stochastic motions of time reversal symmetry are ignored, because these do
not contribute to the deterministic motions, but these parts can contribute
to trajectory distributions and instantaneous motion. It will be necessary
to investigate these motions, whose potential methods might relate to recent
developments in nonequilibrium statistical physics [33]. Nevertheless, in sum-
mary, we believe that our approach can be generally applied to fields relating
to evolutionary game theory and social dynamics (e.g., [10, 49, 5, 25, 50, 8])
to rigorously merge theory and experiment.
Appendix A. Sample resolution
In strategy vector x, we know that the three strategy components should
satisfy PR ≥ 0, PP ≥ 0, PS ≥ 0, and PR + PP + PS = 1. These conditions
mean that the system states in a triangle can be viewed as located on a
triangle plane where PR + PP + PS = 1. To obtain the sample points for the
theoretical models from the triangle plane, we define a resolution parameter
d and divide the triangle plane into patches. We assume that in one patch eij ,
where i, j ∈ N and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 1/d, the values of PR and PP for one strategy
state should satisfy (i−1)d ≤ PR ≤ id and (j−1)d ≤ PP ≤ jd. For example,
when d = 0.25, the triangle plane is divided into 10 patches. Let cij = [(i−
1)d+ d
2
, (j−1)d+ d
2
, 1−(i+j−1)d], representing the vector for the center point
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in patch eij . We take the variable value at the center points in each patch
of the triangle plane as one theoretical observation, and the observations in
all the patches are considered to be theoretical samples for the variable. In
contrast, we compute the average value of all the recorded variable (speed or
angular momentum) values in each patch as one experimental observation;
the observations in all patches are considered experimental samples for the
variable. In this work, we consider different values for resolution d, and found
that our results are still valid when the value of the resolution is changed
(see Figures S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, and S11 in Supplementary
Information).
Appendix B. Statistical coefficients and methods
Pearson correlation coefficient ρ. We used the Pearson correlation
coefficient ρ as an index to identify the validity of a model. As a necessary
condition, if a model is appropriate for a given experiment, its prediction
should be positively linearly correlated with its related experimental obser-
vation. The degree of the positive linear correlation can be identified by ρ.
For a given observation, ideally, ρ should be 1. The larger the value ofρ, the
more appropriate the model. Alternatively, if ρ is close to 0 or is negative,
the model is not appropriate for the experimental system. We used Matlab
R2010b to calculate this coefficient.
Coefficient of determination R2. R2 indicates the proportion of the
variance in the dependent variable (experimental observation) that is pre-
dictable from the independent variable (theoretical observation). Assuming
that the theoretical observation is expected to be proportional to the exper-
imental observation, our linear regression model contains no constant term.
Then, in this study, the value of R2 is not simply the square of the value of
ρ, and can be negative. For a given observation, ideally, R2 should be 1. If
R2 is large, the model is appropriate. Alternatively, if R2 is close to 0 or is
negative, the model is not appropriate for the experimental system. We used
Matlab R2010b to calculate this coefficient.
Statistical methods. To determine which model performs better of a
pair of evolutionary game dynamics models, we used the Student’s t-test
(ttest) and binomial test (bitest). We obtain all possible ρ and R2 values in
different cases in which we consider three different resolutions (0.1, 0.05, and
0.025), two RPS games (stable and unstable), and two dynamics observations
(speed and the angular momentum). For the statistical results in each cell in
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Table 2, the sample points are the signal of the differences of the ρ (or R2)
values between the pair. We used Matlab R2010b to report the statistical
results.
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